---

Monday, December 7, 2009

Book Excerpt: Evaluating Baseball’s Managers - Joe McCarthy

As I’ve mentioned in an earlier entry, Chris Jaffe has written a book evaluating baseball managers that is more comprehensive than anything I’ve seen, titled coincidentally enough, Evaluating Baseball Managers.  He’s allowing me to publish another excerpt from that book following up on the one he published at the Hardball Times about Billy Martin.  This excerpt is about Joe McCarthy, or as Chris calls him, “The Greatest Manager of All Time”.  McCarthy managed the Yankees to seven World Series wins.

---

Joe McCarthy 

W/L Record: 2,125-1,333 (.615)
Managed:
Full Seasons: Chicago (NL) 1926-29; New York (AL) 1931-45; Boston (AL) 1948-49
Majority in: Chicago (NL) 1930
Minority of: New York (AL) 1946; Boston (AL) 1950
Birnbaum Database: +1451 runs
Individual Hitters: +550 runs
Individual Pitchers: +649 runs
Pythagenpat Difference: -107 runs
Team Offense: +190 runs
Team Defense: +169 runs
Team Characteristics: McCarthy’s teams score well at practically everything.  His defenses were good, pitchers were terrific, and offenses were the cream of the crop.  If you could quantify batboy performance, McCarthy probably would rate the best with them as well.  Most notably, his teams possessed great offenses.  Bill James noted that McCarthy managed nine of the fourteen highest scoring teams of the twentieth century.  Admittedly six were Yankees squads, but McCarthy also managed three of the five highest scoring non-Yankee teams.  Neat trick. 
LPA: 3.89
LPA+: 86

Joe McCarthy won seven pennants in eight years, and never had a losing season in a quarter-century on the job.  McCarthy’s success allowed him to publish his Ten Commandments for Baseball: 

1. Nobody ever became a ballplayer by walking after a ball.
2. You will never become a .300 hitter unless you take the bat off your shoulder. 
3. An outfielder who throws in back of the runner is locking the barn after the horse is stolen.
4. Keep your head up and you may not have to keep it down. 
5. When you start to slide, SLIDE.  He who changes his mind may have to change a good leg for a bad one. 
6. Do not alibi on bad hops.  Anyone can field the good ones. 
7. Always run them out.  You can never tell. 
8. Do not quit. 
9. Try not to find too much fault with the umpire.  You cannot expect everyone to be as perfect as you are. 
10. A pitcher who hasn’t control hasn’t anything.

Notably, only the tenth item dealt with pitchers.  Several items are common sense bits that apply to all players, but this list primarily focuses on position players.  That was appropriate because everyday players made McCarthy’s teams peerless. 

Despite his fantastic career record, he managed virtually no great pitchers.  When McCarthy arrived in Chicago, the Cubs had Pete Alexander, but McCarthy had him traded away after seven starts.  McCarthy also had Lefty Gomez and Red Ruffing with the Yankees, but both have their critics who think neither belongs in Cooperstown.  Aside from that, McCarthy’s only immortal hurlers were Burleigh Grimes and Herb Pennock.  Not only were both questionable Hall of Fame selections, but each was on the cusp of retirement when playing for McCarthy.  He achieved a .615 winning percentage without top tier pitching. 

Conversely, one can fill out a lineup of nothing but Hall of Famers from his position players and have enough leftovers for an extra team or two:

Joe McCarthy’s First Team
C Gabby Hartnett
1B Lou Gehrig
2B Rogers Hornsby
SS Phil Rizzuto
3B Joe Sewell
RF Babe Ruth
CF Joe DiMaggio
LF Ted Williams

McCarthy’s best pitchers—Gomez, Ruffing, Charlie Root, Mel Parnell, and Johnny Allen—would make an excellent staff, but are clearly outclassed by the above position players.  In fact, they are nowhere near as good as the offensive B-team:

Joe McCarthy’s Second Team
C Bill Dickey
1B Charlie Grimm
2B Joe Gordon
SS Frankie Crosetti
3B Red Rolfe
RF Kiki Cuyler
CF Hack Wilson
LF Charlie Keller

That still does not exhaust the offensive stars who batted for McCarthy.  Beyond them are Tony Lazzeri, Bobby Doerr, Woody English, Vern Stephens, Johnny Pesky, Earle Combs, Tommy Heinrich, Ben Chapman, and Riggs Stephenson.  Not surprisingly, the Tendencies Database believes McCarthy had tremendous offenses. Here are its results for park-adjusted runs per game:

Most Runs, Park-Adjusted
Joe McCarthy 0.404
Hughie Jennings 0.429
Davey Johnson 0.460
John McGraw 0.478
Sparky Anderson 0.591

McCarthy’s squads almost always finished first or second in the league in scoring.

While McCarthy possessed great offenses, his squads excelled in some areas more than others.  They bunted and stole infrequently.  Also, despite his bevy of Hall of Famers, the Tendencies Database ranks McCarthy “only” twelfth at batting average.  Instead, McCarthy focused on the “take’n'rake” approach in which his hitters practiced plate discipline while looking for a pitch to drill.  Thus despite his lackluster (by his standards) performance in batting average, his squads still did a great job getting on base, as the Tendencies Database reveals: 

Best OBP
Joe McCarthy 0.414
Hughie Jennings 0.476
John McGraw 0.526
Burt Shotton 0.578
Billy Southworth 0.593

His teams came first or second in OBP nearly a dozen and a half times. 

With fantastic position players, McCarthy merely needed durable pitchers who would not give the game away.  Red Ruffing exemplified a McCarthy pitcher.  Ruffing had a career like none other.  He initially played for a perennial sad sack Red Sox franchise, yet still lost games at a greater frequency than his teammates.  Upon arriving with the continually contending Yankees, he suddenly won at a better clip than the squad.  At first glance, it does not make sense.  The key to unlocking Ruffing’s secret lies in the only pitching aspect of McCarthy’s Ten Commandments: control.  In his Red Sox life, he walked 3.68 batters per nine innings, but as a Yankee he walked only 3.03. 

McCarthy did not merely instruct Ruffing and his other pitchers to throw strikes, he made his hurlers more comfortable throwing the ball over the plate by emphasizing defense.  Five times his bunch led the league in fielding percentage.  From 1934-45, the Yankees finished first the league in Defensive Efficiency Ratio every year except 1940, when they came in second.  Six times his squads topped the AL in Fielding Win Shares, and they came in second place a half-dozen more times.  McCarthy normally had defense-first players in the middle infield, like Rizzuto and Crosetti.  Ruffing trusted the solid gloves behind him, allowing him to attack the batters, and throw balls over the plate.  With fewer hits and walks allowed, Ruffing suddenly became a better pitcher.  He relied on his supreme attribute—durability.  That was all McCarthy needed. 

A similar philosophy existed in McCarthy’s approach to hitting and pitching.  His hitters prioritized walks and home runs, and relying on fielders meant pitchers had to keep walks and homers in check.  McCarthy’s teams clubbed more home runs than they surrendered in each of the 22 seasons he managed.  The odds on that happening by random happenstance are one in 4,194,304.  His record with walks was nearly as impressive.  His squads drew more free passes than they surrendered every year except 1944 (when they allowed only nine more than they earned) and with a few of his Chicago squads.  Overall, his squads belted 2,891 long balls while allowing 1,711, a difference of 1,180.  As the list below shows, McCarthy gained more benefit from the home run than any other manger:

Best Home Run Differentials
Joe McCarthy +1,180 home runs
Bobby Cox +828 home runs
Miller Huggins +533 home runs
Tommy Lasorda +506 home runs
Earl Weaver +465 home runs

This includes only years in the Tendencies Database, so partial seasons make the results slightly inaccurate, but McCarthy’s dominance is overwhelming.  When he retired, only Huggins and John McGraw (+232) exceeded the 200 mark.  McCarthy also possessed the second best walk differential of all-time. 
Years ago, ESPN writer Rob Neyer invented a stat called the “Beane Count” to look at how teams performed with walks and homers at both ends of the game.  (Neyer named it after Oakland A’s GM Billy Beane, whose teams excelled at all these aspects in the early 21st century).  It is a simple stat—take how teams rank in home runs and walks received and given, and find the sum of how they rank in these categories, (which the Tendencies Database examines on a per inning and plate appearance basis).  Here are baseball’s most Beane Count-friendly managers: 

Best at Beane Count
Joe McCarthy 2.505
Earl Weaver 2.641
Al Lopez 2.937
Jimy Williams 3.004
Tommy Lasorda 3.021

Only one manager is close to McCarthy. 

A sound baseball philosophy was not enough to explain McCarthy’s exceptional record; he was also exemplary at implementing his notions.  McCarthy had a reputation as someone who could see problems coming two years in advance and adjust accordingly.  There were some occasions he did not read the tea leaves properly—most notably his decision to stick with aging shortstop Frankie Crosetti in 1940, a move that likely cost New York the pennant, but that was the exception, not the rule. 

McCarthy not only knew when to break in kids, but also how to do it.  When Phil Rizzuto first came up, McCarthy sat him on the bench next to him for several weeks early in the season.  McCarthy quizzed the kid, making sure Rizzuto stayed alert toes at all times.  He pointed out various intricacies to the young shortstop, making sure Rizzuto absorbed as much knowledge as possible.  When McCarthy put him in the lineup to stay, Rizzuto was considerably surer of himself than he otherwise would have been.  Rizzuto later concluded that this was McCarthy’s standard practice for breaking in young players.  Rob Neyer investigated Rizzuto’s claims in his book Baseball Legends, and determined that although several other rookies (Crosetti, Joe Gordon, and Dixie Walker) had prolonged gaps as starters early in their rookie season, it did not happen often enough to qualify as McCarthy’s modus operandi. 

The question arises, if McCarthy used this system repeatedly (as he apparently did), why would not he do it more often?  Think it through: to have a player sit next to McCarthy on the bench for that much time entailed a considerable investment in the prospect.  McCarthy would not spend that much time with a player unless he expected the foundling to spend many years in the starting lineup.  Those players do not come along every year.  Also, while the kid has to have enough potential to be a fixture, the prospect cannot be so exceptionally talented that he has to be played right away.  McCarthy would not keep Joe DiMaggio on the bench.  Furthermore, as Yankee manager, McCarthy possessed one of the most solid lineups in baseball, and thus fewer openings than others.  Finally, it is worth noting most of the guys McCarthy established in this manner were infielders.  By virtue of the geography of the baseball diamond, such players have to be a bit more aware of the game’s finer points.  When McCarthy had the chance to break kids in by this method, he did so. 

McCarthy’s method of handling rookies indicates an overriding attitude he prioritized—professionalism.  He preferred, though not necessarily demanded, a level of proper conduct among his players.  Early in his tenure with the Yankees he destroyed a clubhouse card table to make his point on how they should act.  He also instituted a dress code and ordered his men to be clean-shaven.  When a player misbehaved in New York, McCarthy told him to act like a Yankee.  He did not just set down rules, but also enforced them.  That was why shortly after becoming the Cubs’ manager McCarthy immediately got rid of Pete Alexander, a hard drinker who followed the beat of his own drummer. 

That being said, McCarthy was not inflexible.  His Chicago center fielder, Hack Wilson, was possibly an even bigger drinker than Alexander.  However, McCarthy established a prodigal son relationship with Wilson.  Rather than destabilize the team, Wilson’s problems strangely fit into the system as he always accepted McCarthy’s authority.  After all, McCarthy gave him a starting job in center field after John McGraw banished him to the American Association.  With the Cubs, Wilson became the exception that made the rule.  Similarly, when he came to the Yankees, McCarthy also accepted Ruth’s bravado.  After all, there was only one Ruth. 

Still, it is telling that McCarthy’s career really took off once his squad had been cleared of any Wilsons or Ruths.  Before 1936, he finished in second five times in previous six seasons.  Then, with a lineup full of business-like professionals such as DiMaggio, Crosetti, Bill Dickey, and Tommy Heinrich, McCarthy won six championships and seven pennants in eight years.  Their average margin of victory in those pennant-wining seasons was fourteen games. Their closest scare was 1942, when they won by nine games. 

McCarthy’s emphasis on professionalism paid dividends.  By stressing proper conduct, and gathering a core of players who embodied the character traits he extolled, he created an espirit de corps.  Players came to live up to McCarthy’s Ten Commandments not because their manager told them to, but because they wanted to, and they saw those around them doing so.  Yogi Berra once reminisced that when he first joined the Yankees, he failed to run out a routine grounder because he knew the throw would beat him.  Upon returning to the dugout, the great DiMaggio came up to him, and asked the rookie if something was wrong with his legs.  Another vet chided him for not running it out.  Berra was a scared kid to whom the star center fielder had barely spoken.  Berra finally had the attention of the Yankee Clipper, only to be upbraided.  More importantly, Berra knew DiMaggio was right.  He violated McCarthy’s Seventh Commandment: always run them out.  The story happened after McCarthy had left the franchise, but it showed the mindset he instilled. 

That professional demeanor helped McCarthy’s Yankee squads greatly in the postseason.  In his seven world titles, New York went 28-5 in the Fall Classic.  Even including the 1942 contest against the Cards—the only time his Yankees lost to the NL—they still went 29-9.  While this would be an incredible achievement under normal circumstances, against the best clubs in baseball it was almost impossibly good. 

Stonewall Jackson once remarked that an army conditioned to victory will become invincible.  They will endure greater burdens while maintaining faith and order under the direst conditions.  They can fight more resiliently than their opponent because they believe their sacrifices will not be in vain.  That was the case for McCarthy’s Bronx Bombers.  Their ultimate postseason moment came in Game 4 of the 1941 World Series against the Brooklyn Dodgers.  The Yankees, who led the series two games to one, trailed 4-3 in the top of the ninth in this contest.  With two outs, two strikes, and no one on base, batter Tommy Heinrich swung and missed for an apparent game ending strikeout, but the ball squirted away from catcher Mickey Owen.  Heinrich made it to first on a wild pitch.  Given an inch, the Yankees took a mile.  They ripped off a furious rally and won, cutting the hearts out of Brooklyn.  They had followed with McCarthy’s Fourth Commandment—play with your head up.  When the right players with the right attitude are under the right manager, the results can be miraculous.