It’s so nice that the next generation of Sox prospects with Lowrie and Buchholz and Bowden looks thoroughly unimpressive. Masterson is gone. It looks like the only success story they are going to have this year is Bard, maybe Reddick.

best possible offensive lineup here, which means sitting Mike Lowell for Victor Martinez and Jed Lowrie for Nick Green

Never thought I’d see the words “Nick Green” in that sentence.

It’s so nice that the next generation of Sox prospects with Lowrie and Buchholz and Bowden looks thoroughly unimpressive.

Never thought I’d see the words “Nick Green” in that sentence.

Yeah, given his wrist injury, I don’t think Lowrie’s going to be very good for now and the numbers generally agree.  Can he recover from it eventually?  I don’t know.

I was never all that impressed with Lowrie to begin with. He was kind of old for his levels and always had questions about his defense. And his bat never really looked all that impressive out side of a nice run in AA as a 23 year old. I never understood the hype around him.

I never understood the hype around him.

Red Sox hype machine.

Yeah, I was never big on Lowrie.  His defensive scouting reports weren’t very good, and his career MLE is .224/.294/.344 according to minorleaguesplits.com.

It’s so nice that the next generation of Sox prospects with Lowrie and Buchholz and Bowden looks thoroughly unimpressive.

The 2005 draft for the Sox has been cited as a prime example of Theo’s genius and boston’s draft/development prowess over and over.  They took Ellsbury, Hansen, Bucchholz, Lowerie and Bowden.  Obviously a good draft.  But people in the media have been talking about it as if they players they selected were already givens and well on their way to becoming all stars. It’s still often described as this quasi-legendary draft, the kind of draft that creates a dynasty.  Hasn’t really turned out that way.  Nice player.  Low ceilings other than Bucchholz and he has question marks, obviously.

They did well with Lester, Papelbon and Pedroia but it’s not as if they’ve produced a continuous stream of those kinds of players.

Media hype aside, the fact is that if you get one star and one other regular out of any given draft, you’ve done damned well for yourself.  The overwhelming majority of “can’t miss” prospects do, in fact, miss.  And most of the rest disappoint by becoming merely solid major leaguers rather than perennial MVP or CYA candidates.

Shame on the Yankees if they lose Thursday’s game.

Off-topic, so feel free to take it for what it’s worth.

The media, it seems, has decided to simultaneously be silent about Mark Shapiro and be a vocal critic of J. P. Ricciardi, while congratulating Ruben Amaro Jr. I find this puzzling.

Most of the MSM hails the Cliff Lee trade as a big win for the Phillies and Amaro. If that is the case, shouldn’t Shapiro catch some heat as having presided over a big loss? Clearly, Phillies were desperate for starting pitching. They looked in the direction of Halladay and Jays, found the asking price too high. They moved on to the next best available arm in Cliff Lee. Clearly, at this point, Cleveland has to hold all the aces. They could simply insist on better prospects for Lee, and could have gotten them, perhaps at least one of the top 3 of Phillies prospects (Brown, Drabek, Taylor). So it is not unfair to conclude that Shapiro did not get enough value for Lee.

Instead, the MSM has turned on Ricciardi for asking too much for Halladay. Too much relative to what? It seems to me that Ricciardi did the correct thing: he held on to his best asset and did not settle for a haul that he considered underwhelming.

Thoughts?

BTW, the Yankees have 42 players on their 40-man roster (according to MLB.com).  I’m assuming that Nady and Wang have been moved to the 60-day DL, but some schlub intern forgot to update the roster.  Or did the schlub intern miss a DFA or three?

Thoughts?

The MSM wants a big story to write about, or even better, a big story that writes itself.  Therefore the MSM wants big deadline trades to happen.  Therefore, Amaro good and Ricciardi bad.  Shapiro gets a pass because he facilitated what the media wanted by not asking for too much for Lee and Martinez.

Instead, the MSM has turned on Ricciardi for asking too much for Halladay. Too much relative to what?

Too much compared to what other big name pitchers like C.C., Johan, etc. netted in return.  Usually you can expect one top prospect (top 50 overall), a few minor ones with and no players who have shown any success on the MLB level. 

Peavy and Lee (who is a lesser pitcher) fit into this as well.  J.P. was being unreasonable.

Too much compared to what other big name pitchers like C.C., Johan, etc. netted in return.  Usually you can expect one top prospect (top 50 overall), a few minor ones with and no players who have shown any success on the MLB level.

Not comparable in both cases. Johan had one year left in his contract and would have demanded a contract extension. Halladay had one year plus half. And on top of that, Bill Smith screwed it up big time from available evidence. CC had even less, half a year, and netted a top 25 prospect at the time in LaPorta.

Ricciardi was right in insisting on more. It is not his fault that Shapiro got hosed big time.

Not comparable in both cases. Johan had one year left in his contract and would have demanded a contract extension. Halladay had one year plus half. And on top of that, Bill Smith screwed it up big time from available evidence. CC had even less, half a year, and netted a top 25 prospect at the time in LaPorta.

Ricciardi was right in insisting on more. It is not his fault that Shapiro got hosed big time.

Based on this logic (which I agree with), it’s probably safe to assume that if Halladay doesn’t get traded during the offseason that J.P. will in fact accept a package similar to the ones that netted teh Johan and Carsten Charles at next season’s deadline.  At that point there will be a clear definition of what an ace-type pitcher goes for and what to expect.

Yeah, off-season trades aren’t nearly as important as deadline trades in terms of upgrading talent.  There’s a huge premium that can be expected because (in theory) the deadline deal is only going to happen if the acquiring team is in the hunt for a playoff position, which increases the leverage of any upgrade.

J.P. was being unreasonable.

Sure, IF you assume that he really needed or wanted to trade Halladay.  But it seems to me that his idea all along was that he would only move the big guy if somebody got desperate and really overpaid.  Nothing wrong with that.  He didn’t do any kind of a creditable job of getting a bidding war started though.

Well Lee isn’t in the same class of pitcher as Halladay so that’s why Shapiro got so much less.

And Halladay is older than both Johan and C.C. where when they were traded and unlike Johan, Halladay wouldn’t talk extension so it was just for the year and a half. 

If you want to look at Haren (who was both younger, signed for longer, and much cheaper than Halladay) he netted #22, #36, and no one else in the top 100 or with MLB success. 

The Blue Jays asked for Dominic Brown (#17), Kyle Drabek (#24), J.A. Happ (who can probably be a #3 or #4 right now).  That is unreasonable and completely out of line with the recent deals for big name pitchers.  It was a lot more than Haren got.

That was in response to #13.

Sure, IF you assume that he really needed or wanted to trade Halladay.  But it seems to me that his idea all along was that he would only move the big guy if somebody got desperate and really overpaid.  Nothing wrong with that.  He didn’t do any kind of a creditable job of getting a bidding war started though.

Sure but in J.P.‘s defense this time, there were a lot of other options out there (Peavy and Lee) so it’s hard to rob people blind in that kind of market, especially when the Red Sox and Yankees are effectively out of the running.

If you want to look at Haren (who was both younger, signed for longer, and much cheaper than Halladay) he netted #22, #36, and no one else in the top 100 or with MLB success. 

Haren netted both quality and depth. Halladay should be able to do the same.

The Blue Jays asked for Dominic Brown (#17), Kyle Drabek (#24), J.A. Happ (who can probably be a #3 or #4 right now).  That is unreasonable and completely out of line with the recent deals for big name pitchers.  It was a lot more than Haren got.

Just to be clear, what rankings are you going by? This clearly cannot be BA preseason, because none of these guys were in top 25, and Brown was 48. Have they updated their rankings? Obviously, Drabek’s (not in the top 100) star has increased and Carrasco’s (52 in preseason) has fallen, so your rankings might be closer to how they should rank now. For what it’s worth, Donald and Merson ranked in the 60’s preseason.

I also don’t think J. A. Happ is a good pitcher, but we will have to revisit that later.

Haren netted both quality and depth. Halladay should be able to do the same.

Based on what?  You say so but Halladay isn’t nearly as young, isn’t signed for as long nor is he as cheap.  I’d say be falls between Santana and Haren (in terms of value not talent). 

Just to be clear, what rankings are you going by? This clearly cannot be BA preseason, because none of these guys were in top 25, and Brown was 48. Have they updated their rankings?

http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/prospects/?p=5456

Based on what?  You say so but Halladay isn’t nearly as young, isn’t signed for as long nor is he as cheap.  I’d say be falls between Santana and Haren (in terms of value not talent).

Performance adjusted for league. Halladay has worked in the AL East all his life, and is still at almost the top of his performance. Haren certainly is cheaper and younger, but he is pitching in arguably the easiest league (NL West). Halladay is really, really a special pitcher.

Also, Brett Anderson (the best prospect in the Dan Haren trade) is much better than Kyle Drabek in my opinion. I have seen the guy pitch, he has terrific stuff and poise, and holding his own in the MLB at age 21. That alone means that Phillies could not have matched the Haren trade for upside quality.

I can’t get to the page now for some reason, but here is the URL of an analysis done at HBT.  I think they concluded the Red Sox overpaid, and the White Sox really, REALLY overpaid.  Unless Peavy stays healthy and has no decline over the next few years, in which case they only overpaid.

Don’t recall of the top of my head the Lee trade.  I *think* it was fairly even.

Outside of baseball, I read a review of the SABR convention today at HBT, and noticed the below about Larry Manhken.  I didn’t see any comments about this the last few days here, so I thought I’d share.

For example, former THT contributor and Replacement Level Yankee founder Larry Mahnken not only took a group up in his car, but he had a press pass which gave him great parking. He was going to be sitting next to me and I could only imagine the fun the guys in his car had at the stadium. When I got there, however, Larry wasn’t in the upper deck. I asked if anyone knew where Larry and his crew were.

They’d been in a car accident, I was told.

Everyone was OK. That’s the most important part. They wouldn’t be at the game, though. I was initially told Larry’s car was now undrivable, though that turned out to be not true. Suddenly, spending over three hours getting to the stadium wasn’t so bad.

It’s even more gut-wrenching if you know Larry’s position. He works full-time for the state of Maryland. Due to a budget impasse, he’s currently not getting paid. He still has to work, but his income amounts to side jobs. He was the last person who needed this.

It’s even worse given Manhken’s typical luck. Several years ago his apartment burned down when a neighbor went to sleep with a lit cigarette. He became homeless. In winter. In upstate New York. He survived, by living with friends and his car, but this guy’s had to persevere through some really horrible things over the years.

Again, Haren was 27 and had 3 years before he was going to be a free agent with a great contract coming off a great season.  Halladay’s value right now doesn’t compare. 

Haren last year provided more value that Halladay would be projected to provide over all year and a half.  It’s really not that close.  Espcially considering Haren could be signed before free agency (most pitchers are open to it) and Halladay wouldn’t even talk extension.

I know Jorge just had his day off, but picking up on a thought from a previous thread, couldn’t we just rest everyone who needs rest tomorrow against Halladay?  If we manage to lose a tough 1-run game, maybe we’ll get a rep for grinding grittiness.

I can’t friggin believe…because Toronto has another off day on Thurs (they have 4 in a 2-week span), we’re probably going to get Halladay again the day after the Redsox series concludes.  And against Mitre no less.  Play A-Rod and Posada all 4 RS games and rest them in the 2 Halladay matchups.

I wish I knew what the plan was with Joba.  He’s obviously not going to start 10-11 more games.  So who gets those starts?  And do they save him enough that he goes back into the rotation for the post-season?  I sure hope Cashman’s still shopping around for an arm.

Espcially considering Haren could be signed before free agency (most pitchers are open to it) and Halladay wouldn’t even talk extension.

Is that true?  I mean, I understood it as the Blue Jays wouldn’t grant a window, *not* that Halladay was against it.  I mean, there’s more risk there for sure, but I think there is a distinction.  And there are back channels to find out if a player would be open to discussing an extension after the trade.

It’s good Boston traded Hagadone a future Mariano Rivera

I know Jorge just had his day off, but picking up on a thought from a previous thread, couldn’t we just rest everyone who needs rest tomorrow against Halladay?

If memory serves, the Yankees *beat* Halladay last time.  Maybe they really are stretching Hughes out and yesterday was his throw day.  So if Mitre can get through 4 innings/3 ER, Hughes pitches the next 4?  Still a good idea to sit the regulars?

And against Mitre no less.

Or Hughes.  Or whoever Cashman trades for.

He’s obviously not going to start 10-11 more games.

Why is it obvious?  The only people speculating about what the innings limit is, is the media (and us).  ZIPS projects 9 more starts and him finishing the year with 160.7 IP.  If his limit is really 170 IP they could get another start or two out of him.

Is that true?  I mean, I understood it as the Blue Jays wouldn’t grant a window, *not* that Halladay was against it.  I mean, there’s more risk there for sure, but I think there is a distinction.  And there are back channels to find out if a player would be open to discussing an extension after the trade.

http://tinyurl.com/kmqrgu

Hmm, looks like (according to Pete Abe) it is Pettitte vs. Halladay.  More reason to leave the regulars in.  Even if you don’t like/trust Pettitte, you have to admit he’s still got a shot at throwing 7 shutout innings.

[30]  The quote appears to be, “What’s changed is Roy has told us that he’s going to test the free-agent market,”

I don’t know if that is quite the same as, “Halladay won’t sign an extension with the team he’s traded to”.  It just means he’s told Toronto he isn’t going to resign with *them*.  You could take it any way you wanted I guess.  I don’t think it depressed his value at all though.  What depressed his value was his age, his contract in this economy, and (especially) once the Phillies were out of it no team that could afford him that felt they needed him.

here is the URL of an analysis done at HBT.  I think they concluded the Red Sox overpaid, and the White Sox really, REALLY overpaid.

What do people think of Victor Wang’s original analysis on how to value prospects based on their BA ranking?  This is now seems to be becoming the de facto standard people are using to value prospects and that’s what the hard ball times analysis is entirely based on.  Seems to me that using the mean value of production over their first 6 years might not be the right approach given the issue of outliers at the top end and bottom end of production. SG?

Again, Haren was 27 and had 3 years before he was going to be a free agent with a great contract coming off a great season.  Halladay’s value right now doesn’t compare.

Haren last year provided more value that Halladay would be projected to provide over all year and a half.  It’s really not that close.  Espcially considering Haren could be signed before free agency (most pitchers are open to it) and Halladay wouldn’t even talk extension.

Not really. You are undervaluing Halladay mightily here. Haren was pitching at Coliseum which helps his type (flyball pitcher with great defense behind him). It helped Haren that he moved into the worst league in baseball. He had value because of his contract and age, but that value wasn’t higher than Roy Halladay, even at a year and a half.

Also, you are substantially undervaluing the upside potential that A’s got here. Again, Brett Anderson’s work at 21 is there for all to see. He was a legit blue chip prospect. Phillies did not have even one of those.

Also, as Mike K. pointed out, that Halladay did not say that he would not discuss extension with the team that got him. Sure, he said, he would not discuss extension with the Blue Jays, and that is what I find from the source you mentioned. Hardly a news.

[32] - True.  That’s the way I took it for some reason.  The quote from the author (who I assume clarified this… although given today’s media that is probably a poor assumption) was

Roy Halladay is not interesting in signing a long-term extension and plans to hit the open market once his contract expires after next season

There were no caveats like “with the Blue Jays” in either the author or Ricciardi’s quotes. 

Either way I agree with his age you might not want to sign him to a long extension but in my opinion that is still value Haren has that Halladay doesn’t.

What do people think of Victor Wang’s original analysis on how to value prospects based on their BA ranking?

Been a while since I read the original, but I think it is solid.  Yeah the problem is always if BA rates a player as the 30th best and in his first 6 years he puts up 25 WAR you’ve seriously under-rated him.  But *on average*, he’s probably pretty close.  Now of course on-average doesn’t always answer the specific question of “who won”.  But I bet it gets you close enough.  For most cases.

What do people think of Victor Wang’s original analysis on how to value prospects based on their BA ranking?  This is now seems to be becoming the de facto standard people are using to value prospects and that’s what the hard ball times analysis is entirely based on.  Seems to me that using the mean value of production over their first 6 years might not be the right approach given the issue of outliers at the top end and bottom end of production. SG?

The biggest problem I have with the Wang analysis is that it overvalues prospects by employing a risk-neutral evaluation function, which says that you are indifferent between a lottery that pays you 125 or 75 with equal probability, or pays you 100 dollars for sure. I think most people would prefer the sure bet, and therefore would be risk averse. That is why you may need to “overpay” with prospects for more sure bets like ML veterans (after correction for age and injury risk) relative to the risk neutral analysis by Wang.

As for the analysis he conducted, it is clear he was using the preseason BA rankings. Those don’t apply anymore, Marson and Carrasco are no longer considered top prospects by most analysts.

Not really. You are undervaluing Halladay mightily here. Haren was pitching at Coliseum which helps his type (flyball pitcher with great defense behind him). It helped Haren that he moved into the worst league in baseball. He had value because of his contract and age, but that value wasn’t higher than Roy Halladay, even at a year and a half.

Halladay was projected to be worth $40M over the year and a half with a price tag of around $22M for a total value of $18M.  Haren gave the D-backs $24.5M in value last year alone and they were able to ink him to 3 free agent years in an extension. 

If you think Halladay is worth more than Haren then we are just going to have to agree to disagree.  I would have much rather the Yankees landed Haren than Halladay.

Also, you are substantially undervaluing the upside potential that A’s got here. Again, Brett Anderson’s work at 21 is there for all to see. He was a legit blue chip prospect. Phillies did not have even one of those.

I can’t argue too much about this.  I don’t really watch too many minor league games so I usally go on what BA tells me.  If you want to argue their value as defined by BA I can’t really have that discussion.

[31]
I think you meant six shut-out innings in a seven-inning, six-run performance, Mike K., no?

Still a good idea to sit the regulars?

I was half-kidding.  Actually 75% kidding.  I still don’t like our chances tomorrow night.

Maybe they really are stretching Hughes out and yesterday was his throw day.

I’d be really surprised, especially given Aceves’ recent struggles. 

Why is it obvious?  The only people speculating about what the innings limit is, is the media (and us).  ZIPS projects 9 more starts and him finishing the year with 160.7 IP.  If his limit is really 170 IP they could get another start or two out of him.

Maybe you’re right.  I tend to think they’ll be cautious, with the thought in their mind that he’s averaged 16.8 pitches per inning, which (correct me if I’m wrong) is pretty high.

[40] 16.8 pitches per inning

But surely much lower over his past 4 starts.

I’m still blown away by the report in the game chatter that Girardi would move Joba into the pen AND keep Hughes, there, too.  Presumably while keeping Hairston and playing a cloned Ransom at every other position in the field.

Are radically suicidal tendencies not cause for suspension or replacement?  Let’s put ALL our starters in the pen.  And start a cloned Mitre every game.

[42] - I’ll worry about it when it actually happens.  The Yankees aren’t always completely honest about their plans.

If you think Halladay is worth more than Haren then we are just going to have to agree to disagree.  I would have much rather the Yankees landed Haren than Halladay.

We certainly can do that. I will just have one last thing to say: you have to compare Haren pre Arizona trade to Halladay today, with their circumstances and contract. Haren’s value increased because of the extension he signed. Without that, which is the situation with Haren pre-trade, I have no doubt in my mind Halladay is more valuable.

I think you meant six shut-out innings in a seven-inning, six-run performance, Mike K., no?

It may *seem* like that, but Pettitte can still throw up an occasional gem.  What Girardi may need to do is the same he did w/ Moose last year.  I think it was 90 pitches, but pretty much when Moose went past that number he was BAD.  So if he was at 85 going into the 8th in a 6 run game, sure let him go out.  But close game bring on the pen.  I think he may need to do that with Pettitte this year, whatever the actual P/C is.

Moving on to something else:

What if a certain pitcher from Cleveland Indians got put on waivers? Would you want the Yankees to put a claim on him for their fifth starter spot?

We certainly can do that. I will just have one last thing to say: you have to compare Haren pre Arizona trade to Halladay today, with their circumstances and contract. Haren’s value increased because of the extension he signed. Without that, which is the situation with Haren pre-trade, I have no doubt in my mind Halladay is more valuable.

Value as in production - salary?  Remember, Haren had 3 full season vs. Halladay’s 1.33.  It’s possible but I would take Haren on that bet.  Personally I don’t have the ability to go back and project Haren’s value as of 2007 to see if he projected to have more value than $18M but if anyone else that can is interested enough maybe they can settle this for us.

[46] I’ve in effect advocated for that, but there would be a revolt in the clubhouse and beyond - I can’t see it happening.

I was half-kidding.  Actually 75% kidding.

Got it.  Sarcasm meter has been on the fritz; it handles 0 and 100% kidding okay, but stuff in the middle doesn’t always work.

I’d be really surprised, especially given Aceves’ recent struggles.

I have no idea honestly.  But Melancon has also pitched better as of late, and it sounds like Marte is starting to get his arm-strength back (didn’t see him, but Jennings reported his velocity was up a tick last outing).  And of course if Plan B after Mitre was Aceves, and Aceves is struggling, maybe time for Plan C?

I tend to think they’ll be cautious

Sure, but part of their caution may also depend on where they are in the standings come September, and how well everyone else is pitching.  Or maybe 170IP is cautious for them (if their range is 170-190IP).  We don’t know, and we’ll probably never know.  Unlike Torre who seemed to want to justify why he was limiting a pitcher, Girardi doesn’t seem to feel that need.

What if a certain pitcher from Cleveland Indians got put on waivers?

I wouldn’t be completely against it.  But I’d have to know that Ponson was their next option if they didn’t get Pavano.

He’s obviously not going to start 10-11 more games.

Why do people keep saying this?  I’ve been on vacation so maybe I missed the official announcement of Chamberlain’s exact innings limit and the plan for dealing with it, but really, come on.  Why couldn’t he pitch another 60 innings?  It would be less of a year-to-year increase than what people wanted Hughes to throw this season.

What do people think of Victor Wang’s original analysis on how to value prospects based on their BA ranking?  This is now seems to be becoming the de facto standard people are using to value prospects and that’s what the hard ball times analysis is entirely based on.  Seems to me that using the mean value of production over their first 6 years might not be the right approach given the issue of outliers at the top end and bottom end of production. SG?

I suppose it’s better than nothing, but it’s not like BA is infallible.  A quick look at the BA rankings over the last 10 years would sure show a lot of misses.

I think Wang’s methodology probably overvalues prospects, although I suppose you can argue that the rankings are reasonable proxies for value at the time the trades are made and what happens afterwards is irrelevant.  I don’t necessarily feel that way, but you could argue it.

Would you want the Yankees to put a claim on him for their fifth starter spot?

Ignoring the “certain pitcher” part, does it make sense for the Yankees to claim anybody given the current standings?  They can’t block anybody, and I’d imagine that most players would get pulled back.  So in effect, by claiming the “certain pitcher” you are ensuring that you won’t get him.  If you actually want a player who has any real value, you have to hope for him to clear waivers.

Well, the question is probably more along the lines of “would you want to trade for him if he cleared waivers”?

This seems like an awful lot of work to say “Buchholz vs Sabathia in the Stadium? Mismatch.”

I think Wang’s methodology probably overvalues prospects, although I suppose you can argue that the rankings are reasonable proxies for value at the time the trades are made and what happens afterwards is irrelevant.  I don’t necessarily feel that way, but you could argue it.

I tend to agree on the overvaluing issue.  Outside of the BA rankings and those limitations, I do wonder if using “mean value” for a prospect makes sense without better taking into account the likely variation in production and the extreme values likely driving that mean. There would seem to be much better ways to model this. Sam spoke about risk above and I agree with him on that.  Wang’s methodology doesn’t seem to take risk into account enough.  IMO that’s why so many of the trade analyses based on that method make tend to favor the team receiving the prospects either on a relative or absolute fashion.

Value as in production - salary?  Remember, Haren had 3 full season vs. Halladay’s 1.33.  It’s possible but I would take Haren on that bet.  Personally I don’t have the ability to go back and project Haren’s value as of 2007 to see if he projected to have more value than $18M but if anyone else that can is interested enough maybe they can settle this for us.

Here is something for what it’s worth: Dave Cameron’s trade value ranks for 2007. Haren is at number 40.

This year, Halladay was at number 37. Keeping in mind the usual caveats about comparing rankings across years, this would suggest that Halladay should be able to bring marginally better haul than Haren did in 2007.

So in effect, by claiming the “certain pitcher” you are ensuring that you won’t get him.  If you actually want a player who has any real value, you have to hope for him to clear waivers.

Not true.  Say Boston wants Pavano, and they make a gamble that the Yankees won’t claim him.  I.e. they don’t put in a claim.  If Yankees don’t block Pavano, Boston is free to work out a trade, and now if the Yankees want Pavano they HAVE to top Boston.  If, OTOH, Yankees claim Pavano, they can either get him for just the salary (if Cleveland doesn’t withdraw waivers), or can trade less for him since they have leverage.  Now of course, Cleveland would revoke the waivers, and waive Pavano later allowing Boston to get him for nothing (what I think you are alluding to). 

But it certainly makes sense for the Yankees to claim a player they want.  In some cases anyway.

Wang’s methodology doesn’t seem to take risk into account enough.

Yep, and that’s where a large part of the overvaluing comes in IMO.  There’s a very real chance that any prospect, no matter how good he appears to be, will end up providing nothing of value at the major league level.

Now of course, Cleveland would revoke the waivers, and waive Pavano later allowing Boston to get him for nothing (what I think you are alluding to).

I don’t know how many times you can try to get a player through waivers.  I think that waivers are irrevocable the second time around.  But my point was that a player who is playing reasonably well and costing little in salary is not likely to be let go for the claiming price.  Now if we were talking about Pavano two or three years ago, then sure, the waiving team would gladly let the claiming team pay the rest of his contract.  And I’m not sure how much leverage you gain in this scenario by putting in a claim.  You either give them what they want or the rescind the waivers.  The biggest thing is that every team in the AL has waiver priority over the Yankees right now.

There’s a very real chance that any prospect, no matter how good he appears to be, will end up providing nothing of value at the major league level.

Agreed.  Production and value are likely severely skewed with a disproportionate number of zeroes.  A “mean statistics” approach won’t take this into account.  It seems like a poisson model or zero inflated model would be needed to really do this analysis.  The real questions here are 1) What is the chance the prospect will produce any value; 2) Given that they produce some value - how much?  I’d guess those kinds of models would much better follow the decision making that underlie trades.  Thanks.

There’s a very real chance that any prospect, no matter how good he appears to be, will end up providing nothing of value at the major league level.

Well that’s the problem with any grouping right?  IIRC, he took averages of how much value was ACTUALLY produced historically for players in that ranking range.  So if one player was worth 0 and another worth 5, they averaged 2.5.  I’m not sure what analysis is better?  I mean, if you use MLE’s, MLE’s are still taken by saying (essentially) *on average* we would expect a player with this skillset/age/position to put up certain numbers in the majors.  Ditto with projection systems (which usually use MLE’s).

I guess also is there any more risk w/ prospects than with “established” players over age 30?  When the Mets got Alomar I remember the consensus was it was a coup for them…

And in other news, Edinson Volquez, whose IP/season were increased about as gradually as you could ever hope for, had TJ surgery today.

I think that waivers are irrevocable the second time around.

That is correct.

You either give them what they want or the rescind the waivers.  The biggest thing is that every team in the AL has waiver priority over the Yankees right now.

Oh, I’m not saying Yankees claim Pavano and the Indians just say, “You got us!  Just give us a D- prospect and you can have him!”  But I think the argument that they are better off *not* putting in a waiver claim is incorrect.  Having the claim means they may get him for nothing (unlikely), or at least a better chance they’ll pay less for him.  Because then Cleveland has to weigh whether they would get a better offer later from another team, or whether the Yankees would still be a trading partner later (Yanks could get another player instead) and Cleveland would be stuck with Pavano.

If Ponson can be a Yankee twice (maybe three times?), I would have no problem seeing Pavano put on the pinstripes again.

I’ve kind of come to the conclusion that getting so and so from this team or that is not as easy as we fans believe.  I think you have to look at the last time the Yankees have made deals with teams and the relationships that exist between those teams GM’s and Cashman. 
We can’t dismiss what other team’s owners do to discourage doing business with the Yankees.  There has to be a lot of envy or displeasure by small markets in particular after watching NY lap up CC, AJ and Tex over the winter.  This accounts I believe why so few deals are made with teams like KC, Seattle, Minnesota and others.

In fairness, if that is the backdrop for Cashman to face, it is a wonder he can make very many deals at all that are fair to the Yanks.  In the 80’s and 90’s it was easier to make trades because the Yanks were giving up a McGee, Drabek or a Buhner.  I am not discounting that trades could be made with clubs the same way today, it is just that Cashman wants value for value.

And in other news, Edinson Volquez, whose IP/season were increased about as gradually as you could ever hope for, had TJ surgery today.

With those mechanics, it was inevitable.  How they increased his innings is irrelevant.

I looked back at Victor Wang’s evaluation of the Santana trade, and he made this comment (bolding his):

Prospect risk premium: Although the prospect values that I have presented above represent the expected value of prospect performance, they likely overestimate the trade value of prospects. Due to the risk involved with prospects, there is probably a risk premium when it comes to trading prospects.

So January 2008 he acknowledges that there is a “risk premium”.  I also thought originally this work he did was to try to factor in risk, but I didn’t find that article (yet).

You know, I just checked and Pavano is going to cost well over $2M for the rest of the season, including the performance bonuses he’s likely to reach.  So maybe the Indians would just let him go to any team that claimed him.  Even if he is their #1 starter right now.

How they increased his innings is irrelevant.

Yet to hear some people talk ‘round these parts, it’s all that matters.

[66] I’m sure there is some degree of Yankee envy that prevents a few GMs from acting in their own self interest even if that means accepting an inferior return from a team that offers less than the Yankees, but I suspect that most GMs will accept the best possible deal for any given player that he puts on the market, even if it means assenting to an offer from the Yankees.

Actually, it took years for the cost of George’s propensity to overpay for a marginal player to dissipate, at which point other GMs finally realized that George was no longer calling the shots, and they couldn’t rely on his impetuousness to force his GM to overpay the way he once did.

Why do people keep saying this?  I’ve been on vacation so maybe I missed the official announcement of Chamberlain’s exact innings limit and the plan for dealing with it, but really, come on.  Why couldn’t he pitch another 60 innings? 

OK, I shouldn’t have said obviously.  But there’s certainly reason to believe they won’t floor it with Joba.  Perhaps, he won’t pitch into the 7th, which puts a little more strain on the bullpen.  Or, they’ll do more of what they’re doing this week—using the off day to push him back a bit.  My guess is there will be “Joba innings” that are going to lesser pitchers, some of whom are named Mitre.  Ergo, I hope Cashman is working the phones.

(Also, if Joba goes to 170, can he go 25 (or more) in the postseason?

I think the waiver wire is why Cash did not make a deal at the deadline.

I think he felt that teams would be more willing to deal their fifth starters for less after the waiver deadline, and that most fifth starters would pass through waivers (I mean, allegedly, the Yankees asked the Royals to kick in some money if they traded Bannister, for crying out loud! The baseball economy is out of whack right now - no one negligible will be claimed off waivers, I bet).

Also, if Joba goes to 170, can he go 25 (or more) in the postseason?

Not a clue.  I think last year Cashman said Joba’s innings-limit only applied to the regular season, and in the PS he wouldn’t have one (or would have a new one).  That was then, this is now.

I think we all agree the best thing for the Yankees is to do is just sweep Boston the rest of August so September is all about resting players/lining up the post-season rotation, right?  Why don’t the Yankees just do that so we can stop arguing about it?

So January 2008 he acknowledges that there is a “risk premium”.  I also thought originally this work he did was to try to factor in risk, but I didn’t find that article (yet).

That’s a rather important omission.  In fact, that the hard part of the analysis. That’s what makes getting trades done so difficult because that’s the main issue GM’s wrestle with.  That’s not something you can just toss in as an aside.

And the hardball times, beyond the box score, etc. haven’t included anything to correct that in any substantial fashion from what I’ve seen.  They adopt his original valuations, plug them in and tell you who “won” the trade.

And the problem goes past not including some kind of risk factor premium.  It’s in the analysis itself. You mentioned before how he used actual values produced so if one prospect produced value 0 and the other value 5 he’d average it out to be 2.5.

That’s the problem.  Using mean statistics from data with extreme values or skewed distributions can be very misleading.  If a bunch of players are going to produce value close to 0 (in fact - the majority) I wouldn’t care as a GM first and foremost if the average player produces value of 2.5.  I would first want to first know what is the probability of the player producing 0 (or the probability of not producing 0).  Then, given that, I’d want to know what is his probability to produce value commensurate with the talent that It’s not just putting in a risk premium factor into the analysis.  Risk has to be modeled a different way in order to take into account the propensity of prospects to turn into very little.  Wang doesn’t do that. 

Play around with the trade calculator that beyond the box score has created from Wang’s work.  It produces a lot of head scratching results.

[70] - I think you missed my point.

Joba pitched 100.2 innings in 2008.  I thought it was the 30 inning rule.. not the 100 inning rule?

Risk has to be modeled a different way in order to take into account the propensity of prospects to turn into very little.  Wang doesn’t do that.

Again, w/o having it handy, I seem to remember that his *original* use for this data was to quantify risk.  I really think he did stuff with using the probabilities and asking questions like, “how much risk are you willing to take?”, and then factoring that in.  But, you need a baseline to start with, right?  Wang’s work may not be perfect, but I think it is better than taking a swag at it, for example.  And also I think it is something that can be fine-tuned and improved upon.

I don’t think there is any way CC wins.  He has yet to ever collect a big win in his career, aside from the down the stretch run with Milwaukee, which, let’s face it, included a lot of outs to 8 & 9 hitters in NL lineups.

The only lock on that list for me is Joba, believe it or not.

(running & ducking)

Joba pitched 100.2 innings in 2008.  I thought it was the 30 inning rule.. not the 100 inning rule?

Well, that’s the Verducci rule.  I don’t think anyone here wants to subscribe by that.  The Yankees have a rule, but they’re not telling us what it is, or how they came by it.  Which causes a lot of angst here because we want to KNOW exactly what his limit is, and why that limit is so darned important!  But really, if they have a propietary system that they think is better than anyone else’s, why on earth would they make it public? 

Of course, they could have just picked a number out of a hat in January…

I would have no problem seeing Pavano put on the pinstripes again.

Wow, I thought for sure I would only see this statement on Sons of Sam Horn.

The problem with Wang’s model is not how it evaluates prospect risk.  It actually does a acceptable job of showing the long term value of differently ranked propsects.  Similar to how, when you play poker, if you get your money in as a 3:1 favorite, you will always profit from that situation in the long term, regardless of the actual results.

The real problem with Wang’s model is that it measures value based on how much money a player saves (or costs) above his contract.  Ie: the remainder of Peavy’s contract costs 55M, but he projects to only be worth 35M over that span of time, therefore the acquisition of Peavy costs the White Sox 20M dollars.

While there is a threshold at which the cost-efficiency of a contract matters (and for the Yankees that threshold is much higher than for other teams), Wang’s methodology has the effect of suppressing the perceived values of players with high contracts and raising the perceived values of players with low contracts (ie, prospects).  Therefore, his methodology will usually favor the team that receives a lot of prospects over the team that receives an expensive star player.

This methodology, however, completely ignores one of the most important aspects of roster construction: that superlative, star-level players are incredibly difficult to find and are critical to a team’s success.  By Wang’s accounting, a team that gets back 3 or 4 mid- to low-tier prospects in exchange for a bona fide star is probably at worst breaking even, given how cheap the prospects are and given how much money the star probably makes.  However, while that team’s future payroll will become more cost-efficient, it’s roster production will actually get less efficient, because no one of those prospects will ever be able to provide the production that Roy Halladay or Johan Santana or Cliff Lee can provide.  So the team trading away the star will have to, in the future, use 2 or 3 players to provide the production that 1 used to provide.

Cliffnotes: who “wins” or “loses” a trade is usually about who gets the best player in that trade.  Wang’s model completely ignores that fact.  The money and contracts involved matter, and the quantity of prospects involved does, too, but as long as you’re not crippling your franchise financially, the more important consideration is the star potential of the players involved.

[75] Fallstaff, I think there could be valuation functions that could be used to explicitly take this into account. I have one concave utility function class: u^(1-a)/(1-a). This has been used to study what is called the “equity premium puzzle” in economics and finance: why do stocks demand so much premium (historically, 7-8 percent) over a risk-free asset. This eventually got Edward Prescott a noble prize.

Anyway, if you check this function, a characteristic of it is E[U(x)]<U(E[x]) for a>0 and a not equal to 1, or, the average valuation is lower than the value of the average. The key parameter is obviously “a” (anything but 1): a value of “a”= 0 gives you a linear function is the same model that Wang is using. Generally, economists tend to think that a value of “a” equals 2 is a good guess, which points to risk aversion.

But, I think these models could actually be used to derive patterns of behavior of GMs: which GMs undervalue prospects/are tremendously risk-averse? Steve Phillips trade of Victor Zambrano for Scott Kazmir probably tells you he is extremely risk averse even when he values prospects correctly, or he is reckless and has no idea how to evaluate prospects.

I think using a model such as this, which would explicitly account for the risk premium would be a better way to go about than just screaming that GM X got hosed or GM Y is a genius.

“because no one of those prospects will ever be able to provide the production that Roy Halladay or Johan Santana or Cliff Lee can provide.”

Note the value of the lower salary for acquiring an X in a later season, though.

How many baseball sites would be more readable with a LaTEX supported comments section?  Probably not many.

[70] - I think you missed my point.

No, I think you missed mine.

Joba pitched 100.2 innings in 2008.  I thought it was the 30 inning rule.. not the 100 inning rule?

Hughes pitched an injury-plagued 70 innings in 2008, and people are all bent out of shape that he’s not going to get up to 160 this year.

Oh, and 110 + 60 =\= 200.

Pedantically re Hughes, it’s 146 in 2006.

Wow, I thought for sure I would only see this statement on Sons of Sam Horn.

Two words: Kei Igawa. Two more: Sergio Mitre.

Pedantically re Hughes, it’s 146 in 2006.

Is that pedantic, or dogmatic?  Contrapuntally, it’s 146 -> 110 -> 70 over the previous three seasons.  Why should we believe that a young pitcher can safely go x innings above his previous high, even if said previous high was three years ago and said pitcher has experienced multiple injuries that severely limited his development in the interim?  Note that I’m not taking a position one way or the other WRT a strict limit on Hughes for 2009.  I’m simply asking how it can be that the same people, relying on the same “research” can be equally panic-stricken at the thought of either Joba > 150 or Phil < 160.

<i “because no one of those prospects will ever be able to provide the production that Roy Halladay or Johan Santana or Cliff Lee can provide.”

Note the value of the lower salary for acquiring an X in a later season, though. i>

There is absolutely value in having the payroll flexibity to be able to do this, but you can’t always assume that a comparable X will be available in a later season.

That’s not to say that the Indians shouldn’t have traded Cliff Lee for prospects—they should have, if they don’t plan on competing in 2010.  It’s only to say that trading high WARP players for large packages of prospects with low- to medium-WARP ceilings (which is not what I’m saying Cleveland necessarily did (I don’t know the prospects well enough)), while it looks like a clear win according to Wang’s accounting, slowly dilutes a team’s talent base in a subtle, unfavorable way.

The goal, in other words, isn’t just to spend money efficiently, it’s to build a championship caliber team.  The best way to do that is to get players who have the potential to be high impact players in return for your high impact players.

There’s also the added value of acquiring a player that can help you in a season where you definitely know you’re competing for the title.  In a game, an additional run is much more important in the 8th inning of a close game than it is in the 1st or second inning.  You’d definitely value a run or two in the close and late game than several more runs in the game the next day because who knows what’s going to happen in that one.  It could be a laugher, your starter could get hurt, an asteroid could hit the stadium, etc.  There’s an equivalent leverage index to a season, and I don’t think that’s accounted for using Wang’s “8% discount rate” for future seasons.  That works for offseason trades, but not for in-season trades.

“I’m simply asking how it can be that the same people, relying on the same “research” can be equally panic-stricken at the thought of either Joba > 150 or Phil < 160.”

“Relying”, “‘research’”, “panic”.  Some people - their name is legion - are vowing to blow up the stadium with Silly Putty hexafluoride if Hughes is forced to go >= 160 and Joba <=150 given that the moon is in the house of Atreus, but so what?

There’s an equivalent leverage index to a season, and I don’t think that’s accounted for using Wang’s “8% discount rate” for future seasons.  That works for offseason trades, but not for in-season trades.

1) Look at the charts in the article again.  There is a “contention bonus”.  E.g. Philadelphia gains $7.41M in value from Lee ABOVE his WAR-salary considerations.  2) This isn’t just Victor Wang.  He’s done a lot of the work, but Adam Guttridge has taken that to make a “trade model”  Wang’s work here was mainly about valueing prospects.  3) You’ll notice a note, “just because one team “lost” $2.2 million of surplus value does not mean the other team gained the same amount, due to divergent near-term goals”. 

A lot of the point of this model is to try to give values as they apply to each team, based on near and long term goals.  IOW, taking into account the fact that Cliff Lee doesn’t have much value to the Indians if they feel they aren’t going to resign him and aren’t going to contend next year.  Also, I don’t think anyone involved has said this is a “final” model.  They may be able to improve it further using - among other things - some work Wang has done on on assessing risk for player acquisition and trying to give that a value.

And finally, I think just because someone at Beyond the Boxscore (or whatever) wants to publish results of (a version of) this model and declare something definitively, doesn’t mean the model is bad.  It just means it isn’t being used correctly.  Personally, I think it is useful for trying to determine the best way to use resources; e.g. you’ll notice they ran an alternate trade for Philly where they kept Donald and didn’t get Francisco would have gotten more value for them.  Wouldn’t that be something you want to know, so you have more assets later to trade?

the moon is in the house of Atreus

Really?  Damn, that changes everything!