Monday, December 7, 2009
Book Excerpt: Evaluating Baseball’s Managers - Joe McCarthy
As I’ve mentioned in an earlier entry, Chris Jaffe has written a book evaluating baseball managers that is more comprehensive than anything I’ve seen, titled coincidentally enough, Evaluating Baseball Managers. He’s allowing me to publish another excerpt from that book following up on the one he published at the Hardball Times about Billy Martin. This excerpt is about Joe McCarthy, or as Chris calls him, “The Greatest Manager of All Time”. McCarthy managed the Yankees to seven World Series wins.
Joe McCarthy
W/L Record: 2,125-1,333 (.615)
Managed:
Full Seasons: Chicago (NL) 1926-29; New York (AL) 1931-45; Boston (AL) 1948-49
Majority in: Chicago (NL) 1930
Minority of: New York (AL) 1946; Boston (AL) 1950
Birnbaum Database: +1451 runs
Individual Hitters: +550 runs
Individual Pitchers: +649 runs
Pythagenpat Difference: -107 runs
Team Offense: +190 runs
Team Defense: +169 runs
Team Characteristics: McCarthy’s teams score well at practically everything. His defenses were good, pitchers were terrific, and offenses were the cream of the crop. If you could quantify batboy performance, McCarthy probably would rate the best with them as well. Most notably, his teams possessed great offenses. Bill James noted that McCarthy managed nine of the fourteen highest scoring teams of the twentieth century. Admittedly six were Yankees squads, but McCarthy also managed three of the five highest scoring non-Yankee teams. Neat trick.
LPA: 3.89
LPA+: 86
Joe McCarthy won seven pennants in eight years, and never had a losing season in a quarter-century on the job. McCarthy’s success allowed him to publish his Ten Commandments for Baseball:
1. Nobody ever became a ballplayer by walking after a ball.
2. You will never become a .300 hitter unless you take the bat off your shoulder.
3. An outfielder who throws in back of the runner is locking the barn after the horse is stolen.
4. Keep your head up and you may not have to keep it down.
5. When you start to slide, SLIDE. He who changes his mind may have to change a good leg for a bad one.
6. Do not alibi on bad hops. Anyone can field the good ones.
7. Always run them out. You can never tell.
8. Do not quit.
9. Try not to find too much fault with the umpire. You cannot expect everyone to be as perfect as you are.
10. A pitcher who hasn’t control hasn’t anything.
Notably, only the tenth item dealt with pitchers. Several items are common sense bits that apply to all players, but this list primarily focuses on position players. That was appropriate because everyday players made McCarthy’s teams peerless.
Despite his fantastic career record, he managed virtually no great pitchers. When McCarthy arrived in Chicago, the Cubs had Pete Alexander, but McCarthy had him traded away after seven starts. McCarthy also had Lefty Gomez and Red Ruffing with the Yankees, but both have their critics who think neither belongs in Cooperstown. Aside from that, McCarthy’s only immortal hurlers were Burleigh Grimes and Herb Pennock. Not only were both questionable Hall of Fame selections, but each was on the cusp of retirement when playing for McCarthy. He achieved a .615 winning percentage without top tier pitching.
Conversely, one can fill out a lineup of nothing but Hall of Famers from his position players and have enough leftovers for an extra team or two:
Joe McCarthy’s First Team
C Gabby Hartnett
1B Lou Gehrig
2B Rogers Hornsby
SS Phil Rizzuto
3B Joe Sewell
RF Babe Ruth
CF Joe DiMaggio
LF Ted Williams
McCarthy’s best pitchers—Gomez, Ruffing, Charlie Root, Mel Parnell, and Johnny Allen—would make an excellent staff, but are clearly outclassed by the above position players. In fact, they are nowhere near as good as the offensive B-team:
Joe McCarthy’s Second Team
C Bill Dickey
1B Charlie Grimm
2B Joe Gordon
SS Frankie Crosetti
3B Red Rolfe
RF Kiki Cuyler
CF Hack Wilson
LF Charlie Keller
That still does not exhaust the offensive stars who batted for McCarthy. Beyond them are Tony Lazzeri, Bobby Doerr, Woody English, Vern Stephens, Johnny Pesky, Earle Combs, Tommy Heinrich, Ben Chapman, and Riggs Stephenson. Not surprisingly, the Tendencies Database believes McCarthy had tremendous offenses. Here are its results for park-adjusted runs per game:
Most Runs, Park-Adjusted
Joe McCarthy 0.404
Hughie Jennings 0.429
Davey Johnson 0.460
John McGraw 0.478
Sparky Anderson 0.591
McCarthy’s squads almost always finished first or second in the league in scoring.
While McCarthy possessed great offenses, his squads excelled in some areas more than others. They bunted and stole infrequently. Also, despite his bevy of Hall of Famers, the Tendencies Database ranks McCarthy “only” twelfth at batting average. Instead, McCarthy focused on the “take’n'rake” approach in which his hitters practiced plate discipline while looking for a pitch to drill. Thus despite his lackluster (by his standards) performance in batting average, his squads still did a great job getting on base, as the Tendencies Database reveals:
Best OBP
Joe McCarthy 0.414
Hughie Jennings 0.476
John McGraw 0.526
Burt Shotton 0.578
Billy Southworth 0.593
His teams came first or second in OBP nearly a dozen and a half times.
With fantastic position players, McCarthy merely needed durable pitchers who would not give the game away. Red Ruffing exemplified a McCarthy pitcher. Ruffing had a career like none other. He initially played for a perennial sad sack Red Sox franchise, yet still lost games at a greater frequency than his teammates. Upon arriving with the continually contending Yankees, he suddenly won at a better clip than the squad. At first glance, it does not make sense. The key to unlocking Ruffing’s secret lies in the only pitching aspect of McCarthy’s Ten Commandments: control. In his Red Sox life, he walked 3.68 batters per nine innings, but as a Yankee he walked only 3.03.
McCarthy did not merely instruct Ruffing and his other pitchers to throw strikes, he made his hurlers more comfortable throwing the ball over the plate by emphasizing defense. Five times his bunch led the league in fielding percentage. From 1934-45, the Yankees finished first the league in Defensive Efficiency Ratio every year except 1940, when they came in second. Six times his squads topped the AL in Fielding Win Shares, and they came in second place a half-dozen more times. McCarthy normally had defense-first players in the middle infield, like Rizzuto and Crosetti. Ruffing trusted the solid gloves behind him, allowing him to attack the batters, and throw balls over the plate. With fewer hits and walks allowed, Ruffing suddenly became a better pitcher. He relied on his supreme attribute—durability. That was all McCarthy needed.
A similar philosophy existed in McCarthy’s approach to hitting and pitching. His hitters prioritized walks and home runs, and relying on fielders meant pitchers had to keep walks and homers in check. McCarthy’s teams clubbed more home runs than they surrendered in each of the 22 seasons he managed. The odds on that happening by random happenstance are one in 4,194,304. His record with walks was nearly as impressive. His squads drew more free passes than they surrendered every year except 1944 (when they allowed only nine more than they earned) and with a few of his Chicago squads. Overall, his squads belted 2,891 long balls while allowing 1,711, a difference of 1,180. As the list below shows, McCarthy gained more benefit from the home run than any other manger:
Best Home Run Differentials
Joe McCarthy +1,180 home runs
Bobby Cox +828 home runs
Miller Huggins +533 home runs
Tommy Lasorda +506 home runs
Earl Weaver +465 home runs
This includes only years in the Tendencies Database, so partial seasons make the results slightly inaccurate, but McCarthy’s dominance is overwhelming. When he retired, only Huggins and John McGraw (+232) exceeded the 200 mark. McCarthy also possessed the second best walk differential of all-time.
Years ago, ESPN writer Rob Neyer invented a stat called the “Beane Count” to look at how teams performed with walks and homers at both ends of the game. (Neyer named it after Oakland A’s GM Billy Beane, whose teams excelled at all these aspects in the early 21st century). It is a simple stat—take how teams rank in home runs and walks received and given, and find the sum of how they rank in these categories, (which the Tendencies Database examines on a per inning and plate appearance basis). Here are baseball’s most Beane Count-friendly managers:
Best at Beane Count
Joe McCarthy 2.505
Earl Weaver 2.641
Al Lopez 2.937
Jimy Williams 3.004
Tommy Lasorda 3.021
Only one manager is close to McCarthy.
A sound baseball philosophy was not enough to explain McCarthy’s exceptional record; he was also exemplary at implementing his notions. McCarthy had a reputation as someone who could see problems coming two years in advance and adjust accordingly. There were some occasions he did not read the tea leaves properly—most notably his decision to stick with aging shortstop Frankie Crosetti in 1940, a move that likely cost New York the pennant, but that was the exception, not the rule.
McCarthy not only knew when to break in kids, but also how to do it. When Phil Rizzuto first came up, McCarthy sat him on the bench next to him for several weeks early in the season. McCarthy quizzed the kid, making sure Rizzuto stayed alert toes at all times. He pointed out various intricacies to the young shortstop, making sure Rizzuto absorbed as much knowledge as possible. When McCarthy put him in the lineup to stay, Rizzuto was considerably surer of himself than he otherwise would have been. Rizzuto later concluded that this was McCarthy’s standard practice for breaking in young players. Rob Neyer investigated Rizzuto’s claims in his book Baseball Legends, and determined that although several other rookies (Crosetti, Joe Gordon, and Dixie Walker) had prolonged gaps as starters early in their rookie season, it did not happen often enough to qualify as McCarthy’s modus operandi.
The question arises, if McCarthy used this system repeatedly (as he apparently did), why would not he do it more often? Think it through: to have a player sit next to McCarthy on the bench for that much time entailed a considerable investment in the prospect. McCarthy would not spend that much time with a player unless he expected the foundling to spend many years in the starting lineup. Those players do not come along every year. Also, while the kid has to have enough potential to be a fixture, the prospect cannot be so exceptionally talented that he has to be played right away. McCarthy would not keep Joe DiMaggio on the bench. Furthermore, as Yankee manager, McCarthy possessed one of the most solid lineups in baseball, and thus fewer openings than others. Finally, it is worth noting most of the guys McCarthy established in this manner were infielders. By virtue of the geography of the baseball diamond, such players have to be a bit more aware of the game’s finer points. When McCarthy had the chance to break kids in by this method, he did so.
McCarthy’s method of handling rookies indicates an overriding attitude he prioritized—professionalism. He preferred, though not necessarily demanded, a level of proper conduct among his players. Early in his tenure with the Yankees he destroyed a clubhouse card table to make his point on how they should act. He also instituted a dress code and ordered his men to be clean-shaven. When a player misbehaved in New York, McCarthy told him to act like a Yankee. He did not just set down rules, but also enforced them. That was why shortly after becoming the Cubs’ manager McCarthy immediately got rid of Pete Alexander, a hard drinker who followed the beat of his own drummer.
That being said, McCarthy was not inflexible. His Chicago center fielder, Hack Wilson, was possibly an even bigger drinker than Alexander. However, McCarthy established a prodigal son relationship with Wilson. Rather than destabilize the team, Wilson’s problems strangely fit into the system as he always accepted McCarthy’s authority. After all, McCarthy gave him a starting job in center field after John McGraw banished him to the American Association. With the Cubs, Wilson became the exception that made the rule. Similarly, when he came to the Yankees, McCarthy also accepted Ruth’s bravado. After all, there was only one Ruth.
Still, it is telling that McCarthy’s career really took off once his squad had been cleared of any Wilsons or Ruths. Before 1936, he finished in second five times in previous six seasons. Then, with a lineup full of business-like professionals such as DiMaggio, Crosetti, Bill Dickey, and Tommy Heinrich, McCarthy won six championships and seven pennants in eight years. Their average margin of victory in those pennant-wining seasons was fourteen games. Their closest scare was 1942, when they won by nine games.
McCarthy’s emphasis on professionalism paid dividends. By stressing proper conduct, and gathering a core of players who embodied the character traits he extolled, he created an espirit de corps. Players came to live up to McCarthy’s Ten Commandments not because their manager told them to, but because they wanted to, and they saw those around them doing so. Yogi Berra once reminisced that when he first joined the Yankees, he failed to run out a routine grounder because he knew the throw would beat him. Upon returning to the dugout, the great DiMaggio came up to him, and asked the rookie if something was wrong with his legs. Another vet chided him for not running it out. Berra was a scared kid to whom the star center fielder had barely spoken. Berra finally had the attention of the Yankee Clipper, only to be upbraided. More importantly, Berra knew DiMaggio was right. He violated McCarthy’s Seventh Commandment: always run them out. The story happened after McCarthy had left the franchise, but it showed the mindset he instilled.
That professional demeanor helped McCarthy’s Yankee squads greatly in the postseason. In his seven world titles, New York went 28-5 in the Fall Classic. Even including the 1942 contest against the Cards—the only time his Yankees lost to the NL—they still went 29-9. While this would be an incredible achievement under normal circumstances, against the best clubs in baseball it was almost impossibly good.
Stonewall Jackson once remarked that an army conditioned to victory will become invincible. They will endure greater burdens while maintaining faith and order under the direst conditions. They can fight more resiliently than their opponent because they believe their sacrifices will not be in vain. That was the case for McCarthy’s Bronx Bombers. Their ultimate postseason moment came in Game 4 of the 1941 World Series against the Brooklyn Dodgers. The Yankees, who led the series two games to one, trailed 4-3 in the top of the ninth in this contest. With two outs, two strikes, and no one on base, batter Tommy Heinrich swung and missed for an apparent game ending strikeout, but the ball squirted away from catcher Mickey Owen. Heinrich made it to first on a wild pitch. Given an inch, the Yankees took a mile. They ripped off a furious rally and won, cutting the hearts out of Brooklyn. They had followed with McCarthy’s Fourth Commandment—play with your head up. When the right players with the right attitude are under the right manager, the results can be miraculous.
Comments
Yeah, but I’ll never forgive him for that whole 1950s anti-communist thing in the senate.
Right. Casey and Mickey were much better in the Senate.
OT (what’s there to add about McCarthy anyway?), but ESPN is reporting that Pettitte has decided to pitchin 2010. So rejecting the contract was likely a matter of terms, and hopefully they’ll come together on it soon.
Also, courtesy of Chad Jennings, Yanks are looking to (possibly) ship Bruney to Atlanta. What do you think they’ll get back? Upper-level corner IF/OF mostly for depth in AAA (Scranton could use corner OF and a 3B)? AA position player with a little more upside (potential bench player in a few years)? Or a higher-ceiling project who is in low-A?
Would be nice, but I doubt they’ll get back a high-ceiling corner IF/OF who is ready to start in AAA…
[3] Bruney and IPK McCann.
[4] That is:
Bruney and IPK for McCann.
[3] Bruney for Rafael Soriano, who will accept arb today and waive the no-trade rights that come with it. Bruney will get ~$2M to pitch the seventh for Atlanta, and the Yankees will get to sign Soriano without giving up a draft pick.
[6] That actually might work for everyone (not sure if you are serious), if Soriano is willing to either take a little less than he might get on the market (I read a rumor somewhere he’ll get close to $8M a year), or is willing to take the arb-award and try again next year. I don’t know if the Yankees will be willing to do 3/24 for a setup man, even one who might supplant Mo in a year or two. I could see them doing 3/18 for him though.
(not sure if you are serious)
It’s being bandied about on teh intrawebs. The idea seems to be that having to give up a pick will hurt Soriano’s marketability (as if the injury concerns don’t already hurt it enough). So maybe he’ll take something like 2/$12 with incentives and a vesting option. People are guessing that he’d “only” get ~$7.5M in arbitration.
Apparently it’s Bruney to the Nats, so the Soriano speculation is moot.
The internet sez Bruney to Nationals for PTBNL. First tangible move of the Yankee offseason, right?
I’m not sure I want to pay a MR that much especially if they are on a budget but it’s hard to complain about getting that much for Bruney, especially if it is only for one year.
But my personal dream is to never spend more than $10M in any one season on a reliever not named Mariano Rivera ever again (yes even after he retired).
On a positive note that could mean they are serious about Joba and Hughes both being in the rotation in 2010. With Pettitte all but signed that could be Jesus and the rest stay.
The internet sez Bruney to Nationals for PTBNL.
Roster spot for Pettitte?
Roster spot for Pettitte?
So the PTBNL can be someone that is non 40 roster? Or it’s Dunn?
So the PTBNL can be someone that is non 40 roster?
The Yankees need a roster spot until after the Rule 5 draft. That’s probably when the player will be named.
Are we getting back Tyler Clippard?
The Yankees need a roster spot until after the Rule 5 draft.
They had one already, didn’t they? So I was thinking now they could make a Rule 5 pick and sign one FA without the need to DFA anybody.
[11] “But my personal dream is to never spend more than $10M in any one season on a reliever not named Mariano Rivera ever again (yes even after he retired).”
I’d amend that to never spend $10M total on all our RPs after Mo is retired.
I’d amend that to never spend $10M total on all our RPs after Mo is retired.
Dat’s actually what I wuz tryings to saiz but me writings in not so gud.
Are we getting back Tyler Clippard?
don’t laugh. Clippard had a 2.69 era and 9.99 K/9 last year. (but a 4.46 fip and a fluky low babip.)
I’d amend that to never spend $10M total on all our RPs after Mo is retired.
and never use the same pitcher for more than two years.
Did NY underpay Stanton and Nelson back in the day?
I have a question: has anybody done a systematic study of BABiP with the number of times that a pitcher has faced a line-up? I.e., is it the case that first time through the line-up BABiP is low, and repetitions through the line-up leads to progressively higher BABiP? That may explain why relief pitchers have a lower BABiP than starters.
Example: Phil Hughes had a .307 BABiP as a starter, but .257 BABiP as a reliever.
The point is: Clippard’s BABiP may not be flukishly low, after all. He does have a funky delivery that is difficult to pick up first time.
Love Gammons. Here he says that comparing Pedroia and Eckstein isn’t fair (which is true). He thinks a more apt comparison is Pujols.
http://insider.espn.go.com/espn/blog/index?entryID=4720659&name=gammons_peter
[22] For the folks buried behind the “Insider” wall of ESPN, that is no fun at all. Details please.
I don’t know if anyone has looked at BABIP specifically, but I’m pretty sure that batter’s improving after seeing a pitcher that day is a measurable effect.
I’d believe that there is some difference in BABIP, but Clippard’s .207 is better than Mariano’s postseason BABIP.
[22] Partial reprint or reprint of salient points, please!
and never use the same pitcher for more than two years.
With the volatility of relievers not named Mo, that isn’t the crazy idea ever.
but Clippard’s .207 is better than Mariano’s postseason BABIP.
And the Yankees are accused of over-hyping their prospects.
FWIW, CHONE has Bruney as being +2 RSAR, Clippard as +5 RSAR next year. So if that were the trade, Yankees would be getting younger and cheaper, and possibly a little better.
Pretty sure thought that the Yankees will be trying to free up a roster spot with that trade, so the PTBNL would either be a non-40 man player, OR they’ll try to wait until after they are done signing FA, and pick then. E.g. if Clippard is on the list they can pick from and they have a 40-man spot open they may take him. If they don’t maybe they’ll take a class-A IF with some upside. Or something.
[22] Without further details I will guess Gammons made a list of the greatest players currently playing baseball and it went like this:
1a. Pujols
1b. Pedroia
3. Youklis
4-15. The Red Sox 12 aces
16. Chase Utley
17. Casey Kelly (expect him to move up once he plays above A ball)
18. David Ortiz (can’t take away those walk-offs in 2004)
19. Josh Hamilton (he has to make the top 20, he overcame a heroin addictive)
20. Hanley Ramirez
...
1614. ARod (because he cheated and used steriods)
[27] I can’t imagine Clippard is actually on the list of players to choose from. The Natinals are trying to get better pitching. I don’t see how potentially trading a younger, cheaper, more effective reliever for an older, pricier, less effective one makes any sense for them.
Apparently the Nats did not have a spot open on their 40-man roster. So to make room for Bruney, they released Saul Rivera. On his birthday. Nice touch there.
are there literal lists in a PTBNL deal or is it more of a gentleman’s agreement?
It depends, sometimes there is a list of possible returns offered, sometimes the receiving team digs around its scouting reports and comes up with its own choice(s).
Interesting thing about a PTBNL is that he has to come from a different league (that league CAN be a minor league). So the Yankees cannot, say, do a trade where Halladay comes to the Yanks for a PTBNL, and that player turns out to be Cano. In the case of the Bruney trade, the PTBNL could be someone on the Nationals’ 25-man, because the Nats are in a different league.
Although, there is no 25 man in the offseason so I’m not sure how that would work in the case of a trade within the AL.
Will we now see a cage fight between Bruney and K-Rod, now that they are in the same division?
According to Tigers twitter, Yankees are close to acquiring Edwin Jackson and Curtis Granderson.
If true it better not be for much.
I really enjoyed this excerpt. One thing that stuck out to me though:
McCarthy’s teams clubbed more home runs than they surrendered in each of the 22 seasons he managed. The odds on that happening by random happenstance are one in 4,194,304.
This is assuming that there’s a 50% chance of that happening each year “randomly”. I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that the Yankee teams he managed were much more likely than not to out homer their opponents in a manager-neutral environment. Even changing that probablity to 60% per year drops that chance to 1 in ~76,000. Still, obviously an impressive feat.
Bruney probably choked a small animal when he found out.
It’s kind of funny to see Washington take a contract off the Yankees’ hands.
[35] Can Edwin Jackson pitch teh ate? Because I don’t want him taking a spot in the rotation from Hughes or Joba.
It’s kind of funny to see Washington take a contract off the Yankees’ hands.
Yeah, but… Bruney just might be the best reliever on that team. Even if they don’t non-tender MacDougal.
From LoHud:
Feinsand is hearing the player to be named later in the Brian Bruney trade might be the Nationals first overall pick in the Rule 5 draft.
I thought Rule 5 guys could not be traded, only returned? Or is he saying the actual draft pick can be traded?
Also, Girardi’s in-game ‘activism’ makes me think that Granderson might be a big plus on NYA.
Johan Santana was a traded rule 5 pick.
They can be traded (you still have to keep them on the 25 man, of course).
According to Feinsand’s update, it is the PICK. Didn’t know you could trade those. Who would the Yankees have their eye on, anyone know? Can the Yankees afford to keep a Rule 5 on the 25 all season?
Or, maybe, they want to select someone who they will then use in trade…
According to Feinsand’s update, it is the PICK.
Jerry and George will be proud.
“Jerry and George”
?
Wow, that’s a GREAT trade, then, because the Rule 5 Draft has basically ONE good player available, and it’s a reliever, Bobby Cassevah.
Bruney for Cassevah is a good trade.
Cassevah induces groundballs 70% of the time.
In 270 MiL innings, he has only given up 6 home runs.
Lots of walks though, although Bruney isn’t known for his control either.
“Bruney for Cassevah is a good trade.”
I’m not an expert at reading these things but his MiL stats don’t looks so hot to me, aside from the fact that he never gives up HRs. Why is he so great?
Oh thanks Brian. But his WHIP, BB/9 and K/9 don’t look too special.
Yeah, “GREAT” is an exaggeration.
It’s still a smart idea, though, I think - dump salary while getting a decent middle reliever (that they can then trade again).
[48] A lame attempt at referring to the Seinfeld episode “The Pick.”
By the by, did you all see what Herzog said about McGwire?
What a jerk.
From Lohud. This qualifies as hilarious:
In one of the more bizarre moments I’ve seen, someone in the back of the pack asked Francona if the Red Sox would play Marco Scutaro at second and Dustin Pedroia at short. Francona responded with, “Why?” and the guy said because Pedroia might have better range. That drew a how-do-you-respond-to-that type response, and when someone from MLB asked to see the reporter’s credentials, the guy mumbled and left the room. I honestly believe it was someone who just happened to wander into the room.”
I blame the recession.
How does that supposed trade make sense from the Nats perspective?
“What a jerk.”
Not to become the anti-Cronin, but why did you find it so jerky?
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ap-herzog-mcgwire&prov=ap&type=lgns
‘“He’s going to be asked questions about steroids, he’s going to be asked so many things, and he’s got to be open and he’s got to answer,” Herzog said. “And Tony can’t get mad about it. He’s got to put up with it.”’
Maybe this article didn’t include what you were referring to?
I have no idea, DaPuj.
Perhaps they think a healthy Bruney will be a top notch reliever?
Maybe their pitching coach thinks he can help Bruney with his control.
How does that supposed trade make sense from the Nats perspective?
They are the Natinals, does it need to make sense?
any chance of getting a sticky post for the winter meetings / armchair GM’ing? These other posts are interesting, and deserve their own commentary, but it’s almost impossible not to hijack them with all the Free agent talk? Plus, if I’m a few days behind in my reading, it’s going to be hard to guess which link has the bruney analysis, for example.
Not to become the anti-Cronin, but why did you find it so jerky?
Nah, I can see how my take on it was just colored by my general view of Herzog - in a moment where he should just be celebrating getting into the Hall, he’s taking shots at his fellow inductee Harvey and saying that he doubts that McGwire will go through with being the new hitting coach.
[63] I second that idea. Seems to make a lot of sense.
According to Feinsand’s update, it is the PICK. Didn’t know you could trade those.
No, technically you can’t trade picks. So the Nationals will use their pick to select the player that the Yankees want, and then trade that player to the Yankees to complete the trade.
I assume that this trade is actually a handshake agreement, and that actual players won’t change teams until Thursday?
[66] Couldn’t teams use this as a way to protect a player they don’t have room for on the 40 man roster?
Let’s say the Yankees are afraid they will lose Kanekoa Texeira. They have the Nats select him, trade him to them, they decide not to keep him on the 25 man roster all season and sell him back to his previous team, in this case themselves.
[67] The Rule 5 draft selection is a handshake agreement. The Yankees have officially sent Bruney to the Nats for a PTBNL. The PTBNL will be who the Nats draft, and they were likely already told by the Yankees who to draft with the first pick in the rule 5, but that part can’t become official until Thursday after they make the pick.
68-
Interesting if it works that way, although if the player is really a prospect he piles up some service time that way.
LoHud: “But Pettitte is not the only starting pitcher the Yankees are discussing. Cashman flew to the winter meetings with agents Seth and Sam Levinson and discussed free agent pitcher Jason Marquis.”
I’m going to believe that he’s just driving Pettitte’s price down.
[70] And it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense overall, because if there were someone the Yankees really wanted to protect, they could have just DFA’d Bruney and protected that player.
I guess they could trade another player they couldn’t protect that a team like the Nats wanted to draft in the rule 5 (in this case let’s say Kontos) just before the rule 5 for a PTBNL later, have the Nats select the player the Yankees really wanted to keep (again for simplicity let’s say Kanekoa Texeira) and send him back to them in a trade. The Nats gain the incentive of acquiring Kontos, but don’t have to carry him on the 25 man roster all season. The Yankees lose the Kontos for sure, but are able to protect Kanekoa Texeira for an extra year.
You could take it even further and find a team with an open spot on the 40 man who isn’t going to select anyone, send them some prospect from single A who is about to be released anyways along with $50K for a PTBNL. That team then selects the player you wanted to protect and he become the PTBNL in a month or two. They can just release that minor leaguer, get $50K for nothing, and you get to protect an extra player for one more season for the price it would have cost to buy him back if he had been selected and sent back.
Unless their is some rule that covers this loophole?
Jason Marquis would be an unimaginably horrible signing.
“with agents Seth and Sam Levinson and discussed free agent pitcher Jason Marquis.”
“I’m going to believe that he’s just driving Pettitte’s price down.”
“Jason Marquis would be an unimaginably horrible signing.”
GM is a rough job in some ways I guess.
Gammons’ colleague Buster Olney says the Tigers want Phil Hughes and Austin Jackson from the Yankees for Granderson.
very reasonable.
Sorry, this is just too tempting:
http://waswatching.com/2009/11/10/wangs-wing-worth-a-flyer/
“You can have my answer now, if you like. My final offer is this: nothing.”
So I’m guessing that no one is taking that Jackson/Granderson to the Yanks imminent twitter thing too seriously?
What kind of stink is on this Murton guy? Decent MiL numbers, but the dude can’t get a promotion and needs to seek fame and fortune in Japan?
[78] Not if the Tigers are asking Hughes/AJax.
[80] I tell you what.. you’d have to look long and hard at that trade. I wouldn’t be happy giving up Hughes, but that doesn’t look all that lopsided to me.
[72] If I’m not mistaken, a rule V player who is released has to clear waivers first before he is offered back to his original team.
So that should theoretically close up the loophole a bit… ie, if the Yanks trade for Teixera, then remove him from their 25 man roster, all other 28 teams get a crack at acquiring him before he can move back into the Yankees’ farm system.
[79] Something must be wrong with Murton. He was a first round pick by Theo in 2003. See what happens to prospects who don’t get over-hyped by the Yankees or Red Sox and have to make it on their own merits.
[81] I hope that is sarcasm. Unless I am missing something, Edwin has a total of one half season of good performance (Hughes was on his way to the same but had to be sent to protect teh ate), is almost 3 years older than Hughes, and is only under team control for two more seasons.
I know you can likely bank on more innings from Edwin than Hughes next season, but it’s going to cost an extra ~$5M for that. That’s before getting into giving up 3 free years of AJax for 3 increasingly expensive years of Granderson. But please make a case if you see one.
Although Hughes + AJax is a starting point to land a lot of players via trade, so why settle for an OF with extreme platoon splits and a SP who hasn’t been able to put it all together for an entire season yet?
[82] Thanks.
Unless their is some rule that covers this loophole?
Yeah, the part where if you trade a Rule 5 pick the requirement that he stay on the 25-man roster goes with him.
If I’m not mistaken, a rule V player who is released has to clear waivers first before he is offered back to his original team.
You’re mistaken. The player has to be offered back to his original team before he can be put DFA. So if the guy can’t cut it in the show and the team that drafted him wants him off their active roster, they offer him back to the team that lost him first. If that team passes, then they can put him on waivers. If he clears, then he can be outrighted or released.
[83] I was thinking more that the Granderson side of that deal makes up for the difference. I’m not that high on Jackson. I just don’t think it’s a ‘hang up the phone’ trade.
[81] I think you have to look long and hard at Granderson’s platoon splits before you decide that he’s worth either Jackson or Hughes, much less Jackson and Hughes. Or maybe you misread [75] as E. Jackson and Granderson for A. Jackson and Hughes. Or maybe Olney heard it wrong and it really is a two for two.
Granderson may be worth AJack, but he’s definitely not worth Hughes.
http://waswatching.com/2009/11/10/wangs-wing-worth-a-flyer/
That’s a typo. It should say “worth a fryer.”
[86] Hmmmm.. I read it (I don’t know why) as Edwin Jackson and Granderson for Austin Jackson and Hughes.
The player has to be offered back to his original team before he can be put DFA. So if the guy can’t cut it in the show and the team that drafted him wants him off their active roster, they offer him back to the team that lost him first. If that team passes, then they can put him on waivers. If he clears, then he can be outrighted or released.
But if his original team who he was taken from in the rule 5 was the Yankees and they end up getting him back in a trade from the team that drafts him, decide he can’t cut it in the show and can’t keep him on the 25 man, they then offer him back to his original team, in this case also the Yankees, they accept and stash him in the minors again and don’t even have to have him on the 40 man. At least that’s how it appears to me right now. So, there must be some sort of rule to cover this loophole.
My take: Cashman has minimal interest in Marquis, but wanted to help out the Levinsons, with whom he is friendly.
I was also reading it as Edwin and Granderson for Hughes AND AJax, which to me is a hang up the phone scenario because Hughes has more future value than Edwin (in my mind) and Granderson’s platoon splits scare me (he is completely neutralized late in close games by any LHP).
“but wanted to help out the Levinsons”
That’s painful in a different way. Also apparently too transparent to be of use.
That’s painful in a different way. Also apparently too transparent to be of use.
Actually, it’s a common practice. GMs have those kind of meetings all the time.
Obviously, Marquis isn’t a priority for the Yankees, but it’s not unreasonable to think that the Yankees would add him as an extra arm, similar to what Mitre and Gaudin are.
Here’s Wiki:
“If chosen in the Rule 5 draft, a player must be kept on the selecting team’s 25-man major league roster for the entire season after the draft—he may not be optioned or designated to the minors. The selecting team may, at any time, waive the Rule 5 draftee. If a Rule 5 draftee clears waivers by not signing with a new MLB team, he must be offered back to the original team, effectively canceling the Rule 5 draft choice. Once a Rule 5 draftee spends an entire season on his new team’s 25-man roster, his status reverts to normal and he may be optioned or designated for assignment.”
Looks to me that waivers come before offering him back, if this is correct.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_5_draft
So, there must be some sort of rule to cover this loophole.
The entire purpose of the Rule 5 draft is to keep teams from stockpiling MLB-quality players in the minors. So I’d expect a trade like this that was made specifically to circumvent the intent of the rule would simply be vetoed by the commissioner’s office.
[95] I suppose that makes sense now that I think about it a bit more. But remember that any claiming team would still be obligated to keep the draftee on their active roster for the rest of the season.
When was the last trade that was straight vetoed by the “commissioner” or his “office”? I’m not disagreeing with you, MC, just wondering.
“but it’s not unreasonable to think that the Yankees would add him as an extra arm”
I haven’t looked at him, but [73] disagrees.
97—yes. But it does seem that the “waive first” rule is a disincentive to the kind of chicanery being discussed.
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